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1 Introduction
Recent urban economic models have formalized the relationships between
the housing market and the labor market. This literature demonstrates
that if job search efficiency decreases with distance to employment and if
search intensity is endogenous, then a spatial mismatch can emerge, because
a fraction of the unemployed choose to stay far away from employment and
to search less intensively (Smith and Zenou, 2003; Wasmer and Zenou, 2006).
These individuals locate in the city periphery, where they benefit from lower
housing prices but experience longer unemployment spells.
These mechanisms can also apply to public housing. Indeed, the concen-
tration of low-income and unemployed people in public housing is likely to
decrease their access to information on job opportunities. The literature on
social networks and unemployment gives convincing arguments supporting
the idea that access to employment is strongly influenced by the share of
employed people in a person’s environment (Granovetter, 1995; Reingold,
1999). As a consequence, one may think that public housing renters may
ceteris paribus suffer higher unemployment probabilities because they have
lower arrival rates of job opportunities, they search less intensively, but they
stay in this situation because they benefit from lower housing prices.
There is another rationale in favor of a harmful effect of public housing
on unemployment. The literature on the effects of tenure on labor-market
outcomes argues that due to lower mobility rates, homeowners are more
likely to suffer longer unemployment spells. Due to waiting lists for access
to another public housing unit, mobility rates of public housing tenants are
lower than that of tenants in the private market and might then, following
the same mechanisms as for homeowners, end up with higher unemployment
probabilities (Battu et al, 2008).
It is therefore legitimate to test for the effect of public housing occu-
pancy on unemployment. The French case seems particularly suitable for
such a study, in particular because the public housing sector represents in
France as much as 17% of the housing stock, and even 22% in cities above
50,000 inhabitants. The annual mobility rate of tenants is 10% in the public
renting sector against 16% in the private renting sector (Debrand and Taf-
fin, 2005), which is a consequence of a shortage of available housing units
with respect to the number of applicants: once in the public housing sector,
households have incentives to stay in it because moving means incurring the
risk of not having another public housing unit. Moreover, 12% of individ-
uals above 18 in the public housing sector are unemployed against 5% for
people in other tenures, which probably affects the access to information on
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job opportunities of all public housing tenants. As a consequence, one may
wonder whether public housing might act as a poverty trap by decreasing
residential mobility and access to employment in French cities.
This question is of importance from a public policy viewpoint. Two main
policies are used in order to improve housing consumption in France as in
other countries: housing vouchers and public housing. It has been shown
empirically that housing vouchers largely result in housing price increases
which lower their efficiency (Fack, 2006). The public housing sector escapes
this shortcoming but may generate other externalities. This paper intends
at sheding some light on the externalities that may affect unemployment.
The literature on this matter is scarce up to now. Analyses of the effect of
public housing on unemployment were carried out by some authors (see for
example Battu et al, 2008; Flatau et al, 2003), but we are not aware of any
such study in the French case.1
A key issue in the literature on the relationship between housing tenure
and labor market outcomes is the endogeneity of tenure and the identifica-
tion of its causal effect. Endogeneity arises because the choice of housing
tenure is correlated with labor-market outcomes. First and foremost, un-
employment is likely to reduce the household’s income and to increase the
probability to live in the public housing sector. Second, it can be shown
that individuals with a low attachment to the labor-market might search
less intensively for a job and prefer to live in low-rent housing. Finally,
public housing agencies might have criteria according to the household’s
economic situation and give preferential attribution to households with an
unemployed adult. Failure to take endogeneity of tenure into account may
yield biased estimates of the effect of tenure on labor-market outcomes.
In this paper, we estimate a simultaneous probit model of unemploy-
ment and public housing occupancy with public housing as an endogenous
regressor in the unemployment equation. The effect of public housing is then
identified by a careful choice of exclusions on two different samples. Firstly,
we use a large sample of households living in Lyon (the French second biggest
city) and we take advantage of demographic characteristics that influence
attribution of public housing units. In particular, we use the gender compo-
sition of children, which determines the final number of children, as a shifter
of public housing occupancy. Secondly, we use the French National Housing
Survey which gives a nation-wide sample of households living in 102 differ-
ent cities characterized by different situations on the housing market. In
1A recent exception is De Graaf et al (2009) who study tenure effects on the labour-
market in 14 European countries, including France.
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this sample, we identify the effect of public housing through the variation
in the rate of public housing accross cities. This kind of identification is
similar to the one used by Cutler and Glaeser (1997) to identify the effect of
segregation on labor-market outcomes of minorities in the U.S. and by van
Leuvensteijn and Koning (2004) to identify the effect of homeownership on
job duration.
While descriptive statistics and ‘naive’ probit estimates suggest that pub-
lic housing occupancy increases unemployment probability, correcting for the
endogeneity of tenure allows us to rule out any detrimental impact of public
housing on unemployment. This result is obtained for two different dataset
and with different instruments. In particular, the gender composition of
children is a valid instrument which allows us to show that the absence of
effect of public housing on unemployment can not be rejected. Moreover,
we perform a robustness check that consists in measuring the amount of
correlation between unobservables that would be sufficient to explain the
whole effect of public housing on unemployment. As the corresponding level
of correlation is rather low, we conclude that this check reinforce our central
result of no effect of public housing occupancy on unemployment.
The paper proceeds with Section 2 which presents the existing literature
and public housing in France. Section 3 specifies the econometric model, the
identification strategy and the data. Section 4 gives descriptive statistics
and discusses the identification issue. Results and a robustness check are
presented in Section 5 and Section 6 concludes.
2 Background
2.1 Literature on tenure, public housing and outcomes
Public housing is intended to provide a secured, decent and affordable hous-
ing for low-income households (which would otherwise occupy housing units
of very poor quality). This purpose is supported by the idea that housing
carries several positive externalities, as for instance externalities affecting
children depending on the quality of the housing unit. For instance, Cur-
rie and Yelowitz (2000) study the impact of public housing occupancy on
children educational outcomes in the U.S. and find empirical evidence that
living in public housing projects actually improve living conditions and chil-
dren educational outcomes. Similar results are found by Jacob (2004) and
Newman and Harkness (2002) who find with U.S. data that public housing
enhances children’s educational and later employment outcomes.
Still, public housing can generate other kind of externalities that could
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be detrimental for public housing tenants. In the particular context of labor-
market outcomes, several mechanisms support the idea that public housing
occupants may have lower employment levels and experience longer spells
of unemployment. The first group of mechanisms suggests that renters in
the public sector have a poorer access to information on job opportunities.
Indeed, public housing units are often located far from job locations, and
as information on job opportunities decreases with distance to employment,
the efficiency of their job search effort decreases (Ihlanfeldt, 1997). Similarly,
the concentration of low-income and unemployed workers in public housing
decreases the quality of social networks, which are known to be important
in finding a job (Granovetter, 1995; Reingold, 1999). A second mechanism
refers to the lower mobility rates of public housing tenants compared to
other tenures. This is in line with the work of Oswald (1996) on the effect
of homeownership on labor-market outcomes: homeowners facing higher
transaction costs associated with a residential move (costs of buying and
selling home) than private renters, they are less inclined to move residence
to accept a job offer and they might thus stay longer unemployed. This
mechanisms also apply to public housing renters. Indeed, because they have
obtained the right to occupy a housing unit at a rent below market rates
and because this right is not transferrable across municipalities or regions
(owing to long waiting lists), social renters have lower residential mobility
rates than private renters (see for instance Hughes and McCormick (1987)
in the U.K.).
An important issue in the estimation of the effect of tenure on the labor-
market outcomes is the endogeneity of tenure, which compromises the identi-
fication of a causal relationship. Several strategies have been used to control
for the endogeneity of tenure. First, when a longitudinal data is used, it is
possible to identify the effect of tenure on unemployment duration using
multiple spells of unemployment for a given respondent, when tenure type
varies over these spells (de Graaf et al, 2008; Battu et al, 2008; Munch et
al, 2006 and 2008). A more traditional approach consists in using instru-
mental variables, i.e. variables influencing housing tenure but not correlated
with labor-market outcomes. Two types of instruments are commonly used:
aggregate-level instruments (such as the regional share of homeowners as in
Leuvensteijn and Koning, 2004), or individual-level instruments (e.g. home-
ownership of parents as in Munch et al, 2008).
To our knowledge, only a few analyses have studied the influence of
public housing on labor-market outcomes and they differ according to the
strategy they adopt to correct for the endogeneity of public housing. Svarer
et al (2005) study the effect of rent control in Denmark (a different but
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related topic) and find that the probability of finding a job outside the
local labor market is lower for individuals occupying housing units with
high levels of rent control. However, these authors do not control for the
endogeneity of tenure. Flatau et al (2003) find that public housing renters
in Australia are more likely than private renters to be unemployed and
that they remain longer unemployed, but the effect of public renting on
unemployment disappears when controlling for the endogeneity of tenure.
Finally, in a recent paper, Battu et al (2008) use longitudinal data and
a multiple-spells strategy to correct for tenure endogeneity and find that
public renters in the U.K. are more likely to stay unemployed compared
to private renters and that they are less likely to leave unemployment for
a distant job. Their results also reveal important differences whether one
controls for the endogeneity of tenure or not.
2.2 Public housing in France
In France, almost one housing unit out of five is in the public housing sector.
A large share of existing public housing units was built during the 60’s and
the 70’s as a response to a serious shortage of housing following World War
II. Rents in the public sector are administratively ruled. They are on average
50% below the market rent.
Although the public housing sector accounts for 17% of the French hous-
ing stock, eligible households (those meeting an income ceiling criteria) rep-
resent as much as two thirds of the population. Therefore, demand for
public housing accommodation largely exceeds available housing units and
there are long waiting lists for public housing applicants. Consequently, 31%
of households who got access to public housing had to wait more than one
year between their application and entry into a public housing unit; 13%
waited for more than three years.2
Waiting lists for access to public housing are also explained by the inertia
of households in public housing. Indeed, 60% of public housing tenants have
been occupying their dwelling for at least 4 years and 34% for at least 8 years
(against 46% and 20% for tenants in the private market). This inertia,
jointly with the large definition of public housing potential beneficiaries,
explains that the economic situation of public housing tenants, although
poor on average, is also varied: according to the 2002 French Housing Survey,
20% of public housing renters belong to the four highest deciles of the income
2These figures as well as the following in this section are for couple households in city
with more than 50,000 people, accordingly to our estimation sample definition (see Section
3.3).
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distribution (Jacquot, 2007).
Due to the long waiting lists, local public housing agencies have to rank
applicants subject to several criteria pertaining not only to the economic sit-
uation, but also to the demographic situation. For instance, public housing
agencies give priority to single-parent families, couples with young children
and large families.
3 Method
Our empirical model is intended to test for the effect of public housing ac-
commodation on unemployment. Tenure type is endogenous to employment
status because unobserved individual characteristics that influence tenure
choices are also likely to influence labor-market outcomes and reciprocally.
As explained previously, some authors used multiple-spells estimation to
overcome this problem. We argue however that this is not a satisfying op-
tion in our case. Indeed, using a multiple-spell identification supposes to
observe a significant part of the sample in different situations, both in terms
of housing and labor market. As explained in the previous section, public
housing tenants have long spells in their housing. It is thus not clear whether
identifying the effect of public housing through multiple spells would be pos-
sible.
This is the reason why, in this paper, we deal with the endogeneity of
public housing accommodation by means of a simultaneous probit model of
unemployment and public housing occupancy. As it deals with the correla-
tion between unobservables in both equations, simultaneous probit model is
a standard econometric method to correct for the endogeneity issue (Greene,
1998). Identification of public housing effects then relies on a set of instru-
ments. We have two different datasets that will enable us to use two different
types of instruments. In a first step, we resort to Population Census data
for a single urban unit (Lyon) that enables us to use the gender composition
of children as an instrument for public housing occupancy. Then, we use
data from the French Housing Survey to estimate our model on a sample of
households living in 102 different cities. This allows us to use the percentage
of public housing units in the urban unit as an instrument. In this section,
we present the empirical model (Section 3.1). We then motivate our choice
of instruments (Section 3.2) and present our two datasets (Section 3.3). The
choice of instruments will be assessed further in Section 4.
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3.1 Empirical model and econometric method
To estimate jointly unemployment probability and public housing occu-
pancy, we have to deal with an individual-level equation for unemployment
and an equation related to the residential situation, which supposes to esti-
mate an household-level relationship. We only deal with couple households,
because the case of single adults suffers from a selection bias, young adults
being less likely to form a separate household if they are unemployed. More-
over, because dealing with women would imply to explain not only unem-
ployment, but also labor-market participation, our study only concerns male
household heads.
Although the classical theory of job search ends up in the estimation of
unemployment duration models, the two datasets we use only allow us to
estimate the probability of unemployment. This reduced form is assumed
to represent both how local conditions affect the arrival rate of job offers
and how they impact reservation wages. Unemployment is then explained,
in a classical manner, by individual characteristics relative to experience
(that will be proxied by age and its square to allow for a non-linear effect),
education and previous occupation, because unemployment rates vary with
skill level and professional status. The individual’s nationality is included
in order to account for potential discrimination by employers. It is also sup-
posed to influence, in conjunction with the spouse’s nationality, the access
to information on job opportunities through the network of relatives. It is
also worth noting that, because the spouse educational level might be sus-
pected to influence the individual’s participation on the labor market, it is
included in the unemployment equation. In our accross-city sample, we also
consider the average unemployment rate at the city level as a driver of indi-
vidual unemployment probability. Finally, public housing accommodation
is included as an explanatory variable of unemployment in order to test for
our central hypothesis.
Accommodation in the public housing sector reflects both that the in-
dividual applied for, obtained and is still in a public housing unit at the
observation date. It is supposed to be determined in the first place by the
household’s income. This income will be proxied by occupational status
in previous job, educational level of the individual and his spouse, and age.
Further, there is some evidence that individuals of foreign origin are discrim-
inated against on the private renting market and are therefore more likely
to resort to the public sector. Consequently, dummies for the individual’s
and his spouse’s nationality are introduced in the public housing equation.
As our simultaneous probit model includes an endogenous observed dis-
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crete variable on its right hand side (public housing in the unemployment
equation), it amounts to a mixed model. This kind of simultaneous model
requires a coherency condition, which imposes a triangular form (Maddala,
1983; Blundell and Smith, 1994). That is, the observed variable of unem-
ployment can not be introduced in the public housing equation. Of course,
unemployment is likely to affect entry in the public housing sector and to
prevent households from leaving it. To account for these influences while
satisfying the coherency condition, we are restricted to include all the exoge-
nous variables influencing unemployment in the public housing equation. In
doing so, we account for the effect of observable characteristics determining
unemployment probability on the residential situation. We still have to take
into account unobservables influencing unemployment, and therefore public
housing occupancy. The presence of these unobservables is likely to result
in a correlation between the error terms of the public housing equation and
the unemployment equation. The simultaneous probit model ensures that
this correlation is explicitly dealt with, as the correlation matrix of error
terms is estimated. The relevance of this recursive specification is discussed
in details in Section 4.3.
In summary, the observed variables y1 and y2 referring respectively to
unemployment and public housing accommodation are defined by:
y1 =
{
1 if y∗1 > 0,
0 otherwise
(1)
y2 =
{
1 if y∗2 > 0,
0 otherwise
(2)
where y∗1 and y∗2 are latent variables influencing the probability of unem-
ployment and the probability to be renter in the public sector respectively.
The system of latent variables is as follows:{
y∗1 = αy2 + β1X + u1
y∗2 = β2X + γZ + u2
(3)
where X is a vector of exogenous variables including a constant, indi-
vidual’s age and its square (expressed as units of ten years), nationality,
diploma and previous occupation as well as the spouse’s nationality and
diploma (each of them being a set of dummy variables). For models esti-
mated on the Housing Survey data, X also include the unemployment rate of
the urban unit. Z is a vector of chosen instruments, which varies according
to the studied sample (Housing Survey on the whole country, or Population
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Census for Lyon). α tests for the influence of public housing occupancy on
unemployment probability.
As we assume that the sorting of households into public housing may
be affected by unobserved characteristics influencing simultaneously unem-
ployment and public housing accommodation, the correlation term between
the residuals of the two probits (u1 and u2) is supposed to be non-zero and
equal to ρ12. Individual contributions to the likelihood can be written as
follows:
P (yi1, yi2) = Φ2[qi1(β1Xi + αyi2), qi2(β2Xi + γZi), qi1qi2ρ12 ] (4)
where qij = 2yij−1 is equal to 1 whenever yij is 1 and to -1 whenever yij is 0,
subscript i denotes individual i and Φ2(.) is the bivariate normal cumulative
distribution function. The sample log-likelihood function is then:
lnL =
N∑
i
lnP (yi1, yi2) (5)
Such a system can be estimated by a maximum likelihood method. En-
dogeneity tests amount to test the significance of the correlation coefficient
of residuals (Greene, 1998). Note that for models estimated on the national
sample, standard errors had to be corrected for within-city dependencies,
using Huber ajusted standard errors (Wooldridge, 2003).
3.2 Choice of instruments
Existing instrumental variable estimations of the effect of tenure can be
grouped according to the type of instrument they use: some use instru-
ments measured at an aggregate level, others use instruments at the indi-
vidual level. Among the first group, van Leuvensteijn and Koning (2004)
estimate a simultaneous model of job duration and homeownership using the
regional share of homeowners as instrument. Although their main identifi-
cation strategy is based on multiple spells, Munch et al (2006 and 2008) also
instrument homeownership by the percentage of homeowners at the aggre-
gate level as a robustness check. The rationale for using such instruments
is that, while regional homeownership rate naturally affects tenure status
(through a supply effect), there is no a priori reason to believe that it has
an impact on individual labor-market outcomes.
The second group of instruments uses variables measured at the individ-
ual level. Munch et al (2008) use the homeownership of parents in 1980 as
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an instrument in a simultaneous model of job duration, wages and home-
ownership. This relies on the assumption that after conditioning on edu-
cation and labor-market outcomes, parents’ homeownership status does not
influence current labor-market outcome. In a different but related context,
Currie and Yelowitz (2000) estimate the effect of public housing occupancy
on housing quality and children grade repetition at school. They use the
sex composition of children as an instrument, on the basis that sex compo-
sition influences the number of bedrooms needed (boys and girls being not
required to share the same bedroom) and that families eligible for a larger
apartment (i.e. with different sex children) are more likely to live in public
housing projects.
We are going to use the same kind of logic for identifying the effect
of public housing occupancy on the Lyon sample. As we already explained,
the household composition and age of its members are taken into account by
public housing agencies and are likely to explain public housing occupancy.
Large families are given preferential attribution of public housing units and
are less likely to leave public housing because they encounter difficulties in
finding affordable housing, unless they have a high income. Furthermore, it
has been observed that the number of children in a family depends on the
gender composition of the first two children (Andersson et al., 2006). In our
sample, households of which the first two children are of different genders
seem more likely not to have a third child. Therefore, we may expect that
the gender composition of the first two children is likely to influence the
probability to be housed in the public sector. Goux and Maurin (2005)
already used this kind of instrument on French data when focusing on the
effect of housing overcrowding on educational attainment. They show in
particular that the sex of the first two children influences the final number
of children and the housing situation.
In a very close perspective, we instrument public housing occupancy by
a dummy for the first child being a girl and the second a boy, this variable
being supposed to decrease the probability among two-children families to
have a third child and therefore the probability of public housing accom-
modation. In a second specification, we also combine this first exclusion
with a dummy for having four children or more. In a third specification, we
also take advantage of a third possibility: application to public housing is
easier for people living already in the municipality where they want to find
a public housing unit. As a consequence, we may expect households who
lived formerly in the same municipality and moved, to be more likely to live
in public housing. We therefore instrument public housing with a dummy
variable indicating whether the last residential move of the household was
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within the same municipality. Because the last two specifications have two
exclusions, we will be able to perform validity tests of the instruments.
This first identification strategy assumes that the estimation sample con-
cerns a single, homogeneous housing market where procedures for getting
public housing occupancy are similarly ruled. Moreover, this set of exclu-
sions can only be used for families with two children and more. It is possible
to use a different viewpoint and to rely on accross-cities comparisons for
identifying the effect of public housing. Indeed, the share of public housing
varies greatly between French cities. For instance, the lower rate of public
housing among cities of more than 50,000 people is in Frejus (Provence-
Alpes-Coˆte d’Azur region) with 7,0% of public housing units in the housing
stock and the higher rate is that of Reims (Champagne-Ardennes region)
with 40,2% of public housing units. Of course, these differences affect the
ceteris paribus probability of living in public housing. We exploit this vari-
ability for identifying the effect of public housing on unemployment.
Because different cities also have different labor-market situations, we
control these differences by introducing the local unemployment rate in the
unemployment equation for these specifications. Once these differences re-
garding the labor-market are controlled for, the validity of the chosen exclu-
sion relies on the absence of sorting of individuals depending on their un-
observable characteristics accross cities with different public housing shares.
The low rate of mobility between regions in France allows to view this sorting
as very unlikely. For this accross-city sample, we will also use the gender
composition of children as exclusion, although, because the sample mixes
cities with different housing-market conditions, the effect of those variables
on the residential situation is weaker.
The strength and the validity of these different instruments is discussed
in further details in Section 4.2.
3.3 Data
As we already explained, our identification strategy of the effect of pub-
lic housing relies on two different types of instruments, with two datasets
that obey to different logics. The first dataset is a one-city sample concern-
ing Lyon. The second dataset is a national sample taken from the French
Housing Survey 2002.
Our first dataset is extracted from the 1999 French Population Census
and concerns the urban unit of Lyon. Dealing with a single city allows us to
analyze a rather homogeneous housing market, in which access conditions to
the different segments of the housing market can be considered as common
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to all individuals. The share of public housing in the housing stock in
Lyon is 20.1%. Lyon is thus very representative of cities with a medium
weight of public housing. Census data is interesting in such a context as
it is the only data that gives a sample size sufficiently large as to provide
accurate estimates of public housing effects for a given city. The sample
we use consists in a 1:20th sample of individuals taken from the Census, for
whom detailed personal, household, and housing characteristics are provided
(age, gender, education,3 employment status, occupational status, household
type, housing tenure, ...) along with the characteristics of the other members
of the household. As we already explained, our study deals with heads of
couple households (which here are all males), aged 19 to 64 and participating
in the labor-market. Due to data availability on previous occupation, we
deleted individuals who never worked, that is only 18 individuals. The
final sample of individuals for the agglomeration of Lyon contains 10,473
individuals.
Lyon is the second largest city in France. Its agglomeration (defined here
by its urban unit) extends over a 958 km2 area and hosts around 1.3 million
inhabitants.4 Lyon, like many other French and European cities, presents a
well-marked spatial structure, with some parts of the city characterized by a
concentration of disadvantaged communities. Figure 1 maps the percentage
of public housing at the neighborhood level in Lyon. The neighborhoods
with the highest shares of public housing are found in the Eastern part
of an intermediate ring. This pattern is very typical of French cities and
plays a strong role in the spatial concentration of low-income households.
In some of the neighborhoods displaying the highest unemployment rates,
more than 50% of households (and even more than 70% for a few of them) are
housed in the public renting sector. Those neighborhoods with high levels of
unemployment and large shares of public housing have above average rates
of low-educated, blue-collar workers and ethnic minorities.
For each household that was already formed in the 1990 Census, we
create a dummy variable indicating whether this household lived in the same
3In the whole paper, the following education levels will be used: No diploma, At most
lower secondary school, Vocational training, High school final diploma, University degree.
They correspond to the following French categories: no reported diploma, CEP or Brevet,
CAP or BEP, Baccalaure´at, DEUG or above, respectively.
4The urban unit, unite´ urbaine in French, is a set of municipalities, the territory of
which is covered by a built-up area of more than 2,000 inhabitants, and in which buildings
are separated by no more than 200 meters. The urban unit of Lyon consists of 102
municipalities. For practical reasons, we added three municipalities which are enclosed
within the urban unit of Lyon (Quincieux, Saint-Germain-au-Mont-D’Or and Poleymieux-
au-Mont-D’Or).
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municipality at that time. Because Lyon’s urban unit has 105 municipalities,
moves for residential reasons can frequently occur between municipalities
of the urban unit. Our dummy variable amounts to opposing those who
moved within the same municipality to households who did not moved or
who moved between municipalities.
Our second dataset is taken from the French Housing Survey 2002. Hous-
ing Surveys are conducted about every four years in France on a sample of
40,000 households that are sampled for each survey so as to be represen-
tative of the French population and housing stock. Available data consists
in the usual demographic and socio-economic characteristics such as house-
hold composition, members’ diploma, status on the labor market. Detailed
characteristics of the housing unit are surveyed, as well as a large range of
financial data concerning housing prices, rents and household income.
We extract a sample from this dataset based on the same criteria that
we used for the Lyon sample: couple households of which head has been
employed at least once before, who is aged 19 to 64 and participates on
the labor market. So as to deal with situations not too different from that
of Lyon, we further restrict the sample to households in urban units of at
least 50,000 people.5 We end up with a sample of 6,299 households. Using
external data from the Population Census at an agregated level, we have
calculated the unemployment rate and percentage of public housing units in
the housing stock for each of these urban units.
Our sample covers 102 urban units of more than 50,000 inhabitants.
Apart maybe from Paris, French urban units don’t have a large spatial
extension, which means that the housing market in each city can be viewed
as homogeneous. The share of public housing varies greatly among these
cities, from 7% to 40%. Mean, first and last deciles are 22%, 12% and 31%
respectively. This distribution exhibits thus a large variance and it is clear
that households behavior on the housing market is not the same depending
on this rate. The agregate unemployment rate in these cities varies from
7 to 25%. As we noted before, it is not correlated to the share of public
housing.
4 First evidence and discussion of instruments
In this section, we present in turn some descriptive statistics on our samples
in both datasets and discuss the strength and validity of the instruments,
as well as the relevance of the recursive model specification.
5These urban units represent 52.2% of the French population.
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4.1 Public housing, demography and unemployment: sample
statistics
Table 1 provides some sample statistics by employment status (employed
versus unemployed) and tenure type (tenants in the public sector versus all
other types of tenure) for the national sample and the Lyon sample. It is
worth recalling that these are samples of couple households with head aged
19 to 64, which explains characteristics that are slightly different from that
of the whole population. Public tenants represent 21.7% of individuals in
our national sample, and 19.2% in Lyon. Other individuals are either renters
in the private sector or homeowners (21.7% and 52.9% respectively for the
national sample; 26.1% and 50.9% for Lyon). In both datasets, public renters
are in general younger compared to other type of tenures. They are more
often of foreign nationality, have lower educational levels and occupational
statuses. As expected, unemployment rates vary markedly with respect to
housing tenure: public housing tenants are more often in unemployment
than other types of tenure (15.7% and 5.8% respectively for the national
sample; 12.8% and 4.9% for Lyon). However, these differences can largely
be explained by differences in other characteristics such as education.
Concerning family composition, public renters have larger families than
other types of tenures. Indeed, 26.7% of public renters in Lyon have at
least three children, against 14.9% in the other tenures. Families having
four children or more are also more prevalent among public housing tenants
(11.5% compared to 3.6%). Percentages for the national sample are roughly
similar. The sex composition of children also differs between public renters
and other types of tenure. Indeed, among households having at least two
children, 22.4% of public renters in Lyon have a girl then a boy as their two
oldest children, compared to 25.3% for other tenure types. This is in line
with our hypothesis that families having a girl then a boy as their two oldest
children are less likely to have a third child and therefore to be housed in
the public housing sector. Corresponding figures for the national sample
are 21.5% and 23.3% respectively. Note also that the gender composition
of children does not differ much according to the employment status (the
percentage of two-children households having a girl then a boy being 24.6%
for the employed and 25.5% for the unemployed in the Lyon sample).
In Lyon, public renters are also more likely to have moved within the
same municipality during the inter-Census period (that is between 1990 and
1999), which suggests that it is easier to apply for a public housing unit
when one already lives within the same municipality. Differences in within-
municipality mobility rates between public tenants and other tenures are
14
also much more important than corresponding differences between employed
and unemployed persons (a 10% gap between tenure types, against a 4% gap
between employment statuses).
4.2 Instruments relevance and validity
The choice of instrumental variables is always based on two criteria: the
relevance of the instrument (i.e. whether it is correlated with the endogenous
variable conditionally on all the other covariates in the equation) and its
validity (i.e. whether it is orthogonal to the error term of the equation of
interest). The first condition amounts to having Cov(y∗2, Z|.) 6= 0 with y∗2 the
endogenous variable in the interest equation and Z the vector of instruments.
The second condition can formally be written as Cov(Z, u1) = 0 with u1 the
error term in the interest equation. In the following, we give arguments
showing why these two conditions hold for the set of exclusions that we use
in our two samples.
Statistical tests for these conditions are common in linear models, and
we rely on linear probability specifications of our model to perform these
tests. Linear probability models have heteroskedastic errors that will pro-
duce inconsistent standard error of instrumental variable usual estimates.6
Furthermore, the usual tests for instruments relevance and valididity are
inappropriate in the case of heteroskedastic errors. The standard method
in this case is a GMM estimation, for which Baum et al. (2003) discuss the
strength and validity tests of instruments.
In our one-city sample, we use three different instruments in different
combinations: a dummy for the first child being a girl and the second a
boy (this variable is restricted to families with two or more children), the
fact that the household has four children or more and whether it moved
within the same municipality. We begin by discussing the relevance of these
instruments, i.e. whether they impact public housing occupancy strongly
enough. The use of our first two instruments rest on the following ideas: (1)
large families need more floor space and are therefore, all other things being
equal, more likely to apply for accommodation in public housing; they are
moreover considered has prioritary by public housing agencies; (2) parents
have a preference for having children of different gender, and those who have
a boy and a girl as their first two children are less likely to have a third child.
To give some support to this second hypothesis, we look at the effect
of the first two children genders on the probability of having a third child,
6Tests of heteroskedasticity of linear probability models for our different specifications
have been performed. All of them reject the hypothesis of homoskedastic errors.
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among families with at least two children (Table 2). We observe that, con-
ditionally on socio-demographic characteristics such as age and diploma,
having a girl followed by a boy decreases the probability of having a third
child, compared to same-sex siblings, by 3.6 and 4.7 probability points in
the Lyon sample and in the national sample respectively. Having a girl and
then a boy have an effect of the same magnitude though less significant.
As a consequence, we keep the dummy variable for the first child of the
household being a girl and the second a boy as a shifter of public housing
occupancy. Our hypothesis is that, compared to all other types of house-
holds, the “girl-boy” households are more likely to have only two children
and thus less likely ceteris paribus to be tenants in the public sector. Sim-
ple probit estimates of public housing occupancy confirm this relationship:
in three different specifications, the “girl-boy” variable has a significant and
negative effect on the probability of public housing occupancy, after control-
ling for the exogenous variables introduced in our model (see columns 1-3 in
Table 3). In column (2), the effect of this variable is estimated jointly with a
dummy for having four children and more. This second variable significantly
affects the probability of public housing without changing the impact of the
children-gender variable.
In column (3), we consider a third exclusion indicating whether the
household moved within the municipality during the inter-Census period.
Lyon’s urban unit being divided between 105 municipalities, residential
moves can often occur between these municipalities even for short-distance
moves. However, application to public housing has to be done in local agen-
cies and access seems to be easier for households which better know the local
conditions and maybe have access to local social networks that are able to
ease the procedure. Therefore, residential moves of public housing renters
seem more constrained and are more likely to occur within a municipality.
Actually, this variable affects significantly the probability of public housing
occupancy.
Finally, to conclude on our instruments’ relevance, we perform F-tests
of the joint significance of the instruments in a linear probability model
of public housing occupancy. Instruments are considered strong enough,
following Staiger and Stock (1997), if the F-test for joint significancy is
higher than 10. Our results show that the children-gender variable alone is
not strong enough for an IV estimate of the effet of public housing to be
unbiased (F=5.13). However, this exclusion is strong enough as soon as it
is combined with one of the other two exclusions: the F statistic is 14.41
when gender composition is used in combinaison with having four children
or more and 13.89 when used with our mobility indicator.
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We now turn to the assessment of instrument validity (that is whether
our instruments are orthogonal to the error term in the unemployment equa-
tion). Our first instrument should not be considered as correlated to the
error term. Indeed, it seems obvious that the children gender is random. It
has not been chosen by the household and there is no reason for it to affect
the father’s unemployment probability. Previous papers using this instru-
ment clearly showed that it can be considered as random and exogenous
to the labor-market situation of the parents (see Angrist and Evans, 1998;
Goux and Maurin, 2005).
Turning to our second instrument, we assume that having four children
is exogenous with respect to the father’s situation on the labor-market, af-
ter controlling for the effect of the other covariates. Because this hypothesis
is questionable, we perform a standard overidentification test based on the
estimation of a linear probability model with the gender composition of
children and the number of children as instruments. One knows that overi-
dentification tests can fail to reject the null hypothesis if the two instruments
are endogenous but induce biases of similar sign and magnitude. We argue
that the presence in the test of the gender-composition variable, of which
orthogonality is clear, allows to consider the overidentification tests as re-
liable. The Hansen’s J statistic (reported at the bottom of Table 5) shows
that the null hypothesis of orthogonality of these two instruments can not
be rejected at any usual confidence level. As will be clear in the following,
our central result does not depend on the quality of this exclusion.
Finally, we perform a similar overidentification test for our third specifi-
cation, i.e. for a model using the within-municipality mobility and children
gender composition as instruments. For this specification, the p-value of
the Hansen J statistics is 0.266, which indicates that the null hypothesis
of orthogonality of these two instruments cannot be rejected. Again, the
reliability of this overidentification test is ensured, first by the fact that
the gender composition of children can safely be considered as orthogonal,
second by the fact that these two exclusions rely on very different logics.
It seems therefore very unlikely that these two instruments would lead to
similar biases that would make the overidentification test falsely reject the
null hypothesis of orthogonality.
In the national sample, our main exclusion is at the aggregate level: it
is the percentage of public housing in the housing stock in the city. The rel-
evance of this instrument is obvious: households in cities with a high level
of public housing are more likely to be tenants in the public sector. Accord-
ingly, the strength of this instrument is large. The F test of significativity of
the instrument in the first stage estimation is 93.8 (see column (4) of Table
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3).
The validity of this instrumental variable is ensured as long as the unob-
servables that affect the percentage of public housing does not affect unem-
ployment probability and that households do not sort themselves between
urban units based on unobservable characteristics. As to the first relation,
it is useful to explain the variation in the weight of public housing between
cities. In France, public housing projects were largely built during the 60’s
and 70’s and the percentage of public housing in the housing stock today is
particularly high in the north-east part of the country which had suffered
from destructions during World War II. The reason for having built public
housing projects relates to past local considerations that are not particu-
larly linked to the current economic situation. In particular, it is worth
noting that there is no correlation between the weight of public housing in
the city and the percentage of unemployment at the agregate level (corre-
lation is 0.06 and is statistically insignificant). Moreover, we introduce the
city unemployment rate in the unemployment equation. This means that the
agregate variation of unemployment is already taken into account by this ex-
ogenous variable and there is no reason for the percentage of public housing
to be correlated to the error term conditionally on this control. Moreover,
the standard errors in the corresponding estimations are robust standard
errors which are corrected for correlation within cities. As to the sorting of
households, it is worth noting that residential moves between urban units
are inter-regional migrations which are not very frequent in France. Further-
more, it is known that these migrations are mainly motivated by professional
considerations.
Finally, we also performed an overidentification test in the specification
that use the children gender composition and the percentage of public hous-
ing in the city as exclusions. Again, we fail to reject the null hypothesis
of orthogonality of this set of instruments with a p-value of the Hansen J
statistics of 0.636.
4.3 Discussion of the recursivity hypothesis
A potential problem affecting our identification strategy is the coherency
condition that prevents the inclusion of the unemployment variable in the
public housing equation. The question is to know whether not including
unemployment in the residential equation hinders the proper identification
of the public housing effect.
Of course, the economic situation of the household’s members is taken
into account by public housing agencies at the time of application. However,
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the length of housing occupancy is important with respect to unemployment
durations: more than a third of public housing tenants have been occupying
their dwelling for more than 8 years. Therefore, it is maybe not unemploy-
ment that affects public housing occupancy, but rather the other charac-
teristics of the household that determine unemployment risk. To test the
hypothesis that unemployment does not influence public housing occupancy
conditionally on the other covariates, we estimated the reverse system: a
simultaneous probit model of unemployment and public housing, in which
unemployment is considered as a determinant of public housing accommo-
dation and no effect of public housing on unemployment is assumed, so
that the coherency condition is satisfied. In the Housing Survey sample,
we use the city unemployment rate as an exclusion to identify the effect of
unemployment. In the Census sample, we are not able to control for the
endogeneity of unemployment. In both cases, and surprisingly enough, we
do not observe any effect of unemployment on the probability to be ten-
ant in the public sector (the z statistic for the unemployment coefficient is
0.52 in the first case and 0.27 in the second case, showing the absence of
any significant effet of unemployment on the probability of public housing
occupancy).7
This result probably ensues from the inertia of public housing occupants:
once in public housing, households have very low incentives to leave it. In
other words, those findings could be explained by the fact that, although
unemployed individuals may be more likely to obtain a public housing unit,
we consider here the cross section of all public housing renters, who are
likely to have left unemployment but remained in the public housing sector
in order to benefit from reduced housing rents.
5 Results
In this section, we present in turn results of simple probit models of unem-
ployment (Section 5.1) and results of the simultaneous probit model (Section
5.2). We also provide a last robustness check using a counterfactual exer-
cise in which we impose some correlation between unobservables affecting
unemployment and public housing occupancy (Section 5.3).
7Detailed results available from the authors on request.
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5.1 Probit estimates of the unemployment equation
Table 4 gives marginal effects for the probit of unemployment for the two
samples, for all households (columns 1 and 3) and for those with at least
two children (columns 2 and 4). We find very conventional results regarding
individual determinants of employment status. Young individuals are more
often unemployed, and the probability to be unemployed declines until the
age of 43, after which it increases again, which is in line with observed un-
employment rates by age. Individuals without any diploma or with only a
short vocational training are more likely not to have a job, whereas people
who were previously independent workers or executives are less unemployed
than others. The two variables related to nationality have significant effects:
the probability of unemployment of people of foreign nationality is increased
by 5.3 points in Lyon sample and 4.2 points in the national sample, com-
pared with French individuals born in France. A weaker effect is found for
individuals of French nationality born abroad.
As to the effect of public housing, these probit estimates show that the
unemployment probability increases with public housing occupancy. In Lyon
sample, public housing tenants have an unemployment probability higher
by 3.5 points than households in other tenures (3.4 for households with two
children and more). In the national sample, this estimated marginal effect of
public housing occupancy is 5.6 points (7.0 for households with two children
and more). If we compare this effect to that of nationality, we observe that
the impact of public housing is a little smaller in Lyon sample and a little
higher in the national sample, but of the same magnitude. However, these
estimation results very likely suffer from an endogeneity bias.
5.2 Simultaneous probit model estimates
Table 5 presents the marginal effects estimated from the simultaneous pro-
bit model for Lyon’s sample for three different specifications concerning
households with two children or more. Table 6 presents the results of the
simultaneous probit model for the Housing Survey sample. In this table,
model 1 concerns the whole sample and model 2 is restricted to households
with two children or more. Marginal effects of exogenous variables in the
unemployment equation being very similar to the simple probit results, we
do not comment on them here.
We look first at the determinants of public housing occupancy for Census
data (Table 5). Recall that we are focusing on households with at least two
children, in order to be able to use the gender composition of children as
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instrument. Public housing occupancy decreases steadily with age. The
other demographic variables, that are used as exclusions, have the expected
effects. Households with four children and more are more likely to rent
a public housing unit compared to households with two or three children
(Model 2). Households with the oldest child being a girl and the second a
boy are less likely to be in public housing. The effect is stable accross the
three specifications where the variable is used. Household heads of foreign
nationality are by about 13 probability points more likely to be in public
housing. The origin of the spouse have a similar effect, though of weaker
magnitude. These observations might reflect the fact that foreign individuals
are pushed toward the public housing sector due to discrimination on the
housing market.
As far as socioeconomic variables are concerned, occupational status
along with education explains the propensity to live in a public housing
unit. Blue-collar workers and office workers are by 16 points and 13 points
more likely to rent a public housing unit than intermediate professions (the
reference category). The effect of educational level of the household head is
less clear. Contrarily, the spouse’s educational level strongly affects public
housing occupancy: the possibility to have or not a second wage in the
household (low educated women having a weak incentive to take part in the
labor-force) is naturally important in determining residential choices and is
considered by public housing offices during the application process.
Results based on the Housing Survey data are very close to those on
Census data (Table 6). One difference is that the effect of age on this
dataset is weaker (Model 2 in Table 6) but the minimum is very close. This
difference is not surprising as the conditions on the housing market might
differ in Lyon compared to the set of all urban units that are in the Housing
Survey sample.
Turning to the unemployment equation, our results show that public
housing occupancy does not have any impact on unemployment. Indeed,
whatever the set of instruments used, the dataset (Population census or
Housing Survey) and, for Housing Survey data, the studied sample (all
households or households with at least two children), the marginal effect
of public housing occupancy on unemployment is not significantly different
from zero at a 10% level. This is in contradiction with positive effects ob-
tained in “naive” probit estimates and shows that accounting for endogeneity
rules out any effect of public housing on unemployment.
The robustness of these results is conditional on the quality of the differ-
ent instruments. All the sets of instruments that we use pass the standard
relevance and overidentification tests. However, these tests may be consid-
21
ered as possibly missleading under certain circumstances. We argue that
even with this pessimistic viewpoint, the specification in which the only
exclusion is the gender composition of children prooves the absence of any
effect of public housing on unemployment.
Indeed, as argued in section 4.2 there are good reasons to view the gender
composition of children as exogenous to the father’s behavior on the labor-
market. The only drawback of this instrument is that it is weak. However,
it is easy to test the null hypothesis that the endogenous variable has no
effect on unemployment using a Stock-Wright statistic, which is robut in the
presence of weak instruments (Stock and Wright, 2000). The p-value associ-
ated with this test in the specification with the children gender composition
as the sole instrument is 0.47.8 This test is another argument showing that
we can safely consider that public housing occupancy has no effect on the
employment status of public housing tenants.
Estimated correlation coefficients of error terms are positive in all cases.
This suggests that unobserved determinants of public housing occupancy are
positively correlated to unobserved characteristics affecting unemployment.
These correlation coefficients are however unsignificant. We will come back
to this point in the next section.
5.3 Robustness check
Our results suggest that public housing does not have any detrimental im-
pact on unemployment on the basis of our instruments. However, because
the validity of instrumental variables is often controversial, it is worth pro-
viding a final robustness check that is independent on the quality of our
instruments. Our analysis here is similar to the one used by Altonji et al
(2005) and is aimed at determining the amount of selection on unobservables
that could explain the whole effect of public housing on unemployment. The
principle of this analysis rests on the idea that in the absence of any valid
instrument (i.e. in the case where the exogenous variables influencing unem-
ployment and public housing are exactly the same), the system of equations
given by (3) can be estimated while fixing the value of the correlation coef-
ficient ρ12. In doing so, we impose a certain amount of correlation between
unobservables affecting the two outcomes. Then, by repeating this opera-
tion for increasing values of ρ12 and examining coefficient estimates on the
public housing variable in the unemployment equation, one can determine
8More specifically, the statistic is 0.52 and is distributed Chi-square with one degree
of freedom.
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the degree of correlation between unobservables that is needed to make the
effect of public housing unsignificant.
Table 7 reports estimates of public housing effects obtained from simul-
taneous probit models that include the same set of exogenous variables in
both equations (that is age and its square, nationality, education, previous
occupation, spouse’s nationality and education) but no instrument. We vary
ρ12 from 0 (which corresponds to the single probit model of unemployment
of Table 4) to 0.25 and repeat the analyses for our two datasets, on the
whole sample as well as on the sample of households having at least two
children. For the full sample on Lyon (panel A of Table 7), the marginal
effect of public housing is 0.035 and is significantly different from zero when
ρ = 0. This effect declines gradually as ρ increases and becomes non signif-
icantly different from zero when ρ jumps from 0.10 to 0.15. Similar results
are found for the sample of Lyon’s households with at least two children
(panel B). For the national sample, marginal effects of public housing when
ρ = 0 are 0.056 for all households, and 0.070 for households with at least two
children. In these cases, the public housing effect becomes non significant
when ρ jumps from 0.15 to 0.20 for all households (panel C) and from 0.20
to 0.25 for those with at least two children (panel D).
Clearly, these are only small correlation coefficients which are likely to
arise in the context we are studying. Indeed, a selection in the public housing
sector of households based on their unobserved characteristics can occur over
time. For instance, for a given educational level, some individuals will be
successful in their job and will improve their positions in their firm over
time. They are likely to have increased wages that will allow them to leave
the public housing sector and they are also likely to have a lower risk of
unemployment. If such a selection occurs, households who stay in public
housing have on the contrary detrimental unobserved characteristics in terms
of labor-market outcomes, which would explain the effect of public housing
in probit models of unemployment. The conclusion we draw is thus a strong
one: public housing occupancy is not likely to have any detrimental impact
on unemployment, as only a small amount of selection on unobservables is
enough to completely wipe out the positive effect found in ‘naive’ single
probit estimates.
6 Conclusion
Estimating properly the effect of public housing on unemployment is crucial
because it has important policy implications. It is however a difficult task,
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because the two behaviors are intrinsically related. Actually, there is no
ideal method for dealing with the endogeneity issue in this context. We
showed why a multiple-spells method is not really possible in our case, which
explains that we chose to resort to an instrumental method.
Our contribution in this area consists in using several convergent meth-
ods. First, we estimate the same model on two samples having very different
logics. On one sample, we instrument public housing with the gender compo-
sition of children, the exogeneity of which has been thoroughly documented
in previous studies. Although this instrument is weak in our case, we show
that it still enables us to test for the nullity of the effect of public housing
on unemployment. On the other sample, we take advantage of the variation
in the share of public housing at the city level to identify the effect of pub-
lic housing occupancy. This allows us to estimate our model for all couple
households, whatever the number of children. Finally, we also perform a
robustness check that consists in measuring the amount of correlation be-
tween unobservables that would be sufficient to explain the whole effect of
public housing on unemployment. As the corresponding level of correlation
is rather low, we conclude that this check reinforce our central result of no
effect of public housing occupancy on unemployment.
This result is important from a public policy viewpoint. Actually, even
if the mobility of public tenants is markedly lower than the mobility of
other tenants, we show that this does not impact unemployment probability.
This sheds some light on the debate between housing subsidies and public
housing. On one side, housing subsidies are known to contribute to rent
increases. On the other side, public housing might generate detrimental
externalities. Currie and Yelowitz (2000) showed that children are positively
affected by living in a public housing project. We show that this is not
ruled out by a negative effect on the parents’ outcomes on the labor market.
However, public housing in France is known to be a powerful source of
urban segregation. It is then on the research agenda to show that the spatial
concentration of low-income households generated by public housing projects
does not harm these households either.
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Figure 1: Percentage of housing units belonging to the public sector in Lyon
28
L
y
o
n
sa
m
p
le
(P
o
p
u
la
ti
o
n
C
en
su
s)
N
a
ti
o
n
a
l
sa
m
p
le
(H
o
u
si
n
g
S
u
rv
ey
)
E
m
p
l.
U
n
em
p
.
P
u
b
l.
O
th
er
s
T
o
ta
l
E
m
p
l.
U
n
em
p
.
P
u
b
l.
O
th
er
s
T
o
ta
l
re
n
t.
re
n
t.
N
u
m
b
er
o
f
o
b
se
rv
a
ti
o
n
s
9
,8
0
0
6
7
3
2
,0
0
7
8
,4
6
6
1
0
,4
7
3
5
,7
9
9
5
0
0
1
,3
7
0
4
,9
2
9
6
,2
9
9
U
n
em
p
lo
y
ed
0
.0
1
0
0
.0
1
2
.8
4
.9
6
.4
0
.0
1
0
0
.0
1
5
.7
5
.8
7
.9
T
e
n
u
r
e
ty
p
e
P
u
b
li
c
re
n
te
r
1
7
.9
3
8
.0
1
0
0
.0
0
.0
1
9
.2
1
9
.9
4
3
.0
1
0
0
.0
0
.0
2
1
.7
P
ri
v
a
te
re
n
te
r
2
5
.9
3
2
.2
0
.0
3
2
.3
2
6
.1
2
1
.4
2
4
.4
0
.0
2
7
.7
2
1
.7
H
o
m
eo
w
n
er
5
2
.6
2
6
.5
0
.0
6
3
.0
5
0
.9
5
5
.0
2
9
.2
0
.0
6
7
.7
5
2
.9
O
th
er
3
.9
3
.3
0
.0
4
.7
3
.8
3
.7
3
.4
0
.0
4
.6
3
.7
P
e
r
so
n
a
l
c
h
a
r
a
c
te
r
is
ti
c
s
A
g
e
4
1
.8
4
1
.6
3
9
.7
4
2
.3
4
1
.8
4
1
.2
4
1
.5
3
8
.3
4
2
.1
4
1
.2
N
a
ti
o
n
a
li
ty
F
re
n
ch
b
o
rn
in
F
ra
n
ce
8
1
.7
6
2
.9
6
3
.1
8
4
.6
8
0
.5
8
7
.3
7
1
.0
7
6
.9
8
8
.5
8
6
.0
F
o
re
ig
n
n
a
ti
o
n
a
li
ty
8
.5
2
4
.4
2
3
.0
6
.3
9
.5
8
.4
2
1
.0
1
6
.4
7
.4
9
.4
F
re
n
ch
b
o
rn
a
b
ro
a
d
9
.7
1
2
.8
1
3
.9
9
.1
1
0
.0
4
.3
8
.0
6
.6
4
.1
4
.6
E
d
u
ca
ti
o
n
N
o
d
ip
lo
m
a
1
2
.8
2
4
.8
2
8
.1
1
0
.1
1
3
.6
1
0
.5
2
5
.8
2
3
.5
8
.5
1
1
.7
A
t
m
o
st
lo
w
er
se
c.
ed
u
.
1
2
.5
1
6
.6
1
5
.9
1
2
.0
1
2
.7
1
1
.5
1
4
.4
1
4
.2
1
1
.2
1
1
.8
V
o
ca
ti
o
n
a
l
tr
a
in
in
g
2
8
.5
2
7
.2
3
4
.5
2
7
.0
2
8
.4
3
1
.7
3
0
.8
3
7
.6
3
0
.0
3
1
.7
H
ig
h
sc
h
o
o
l
fi
n
a
l
d
ip
lo
m
a
1
2
.9
1
0
.6
1
0
.6
1
3
.2
1
2
.7
1
4
.1
9
.4
1
0
.7
1
4
.5
1
3
.7
U
n
iv
er
si
ty
d
ip
lo
m
a
3
3
.3
2
0
.8
1
0
.9
3
7
.6
3
2
.5
3
2
.0
1
9
.6
1
4
.0
3
5
.8
3
1
.1
O
cc
u
p
a
ti
o
n
a
l
st
a
tu
s
F
a
rm
er
o
r
in
d
ep
en
d
en
t
w
o
rk
er
1
0
.6
5
.5
3
.3
1
1
.9
1
0
.3
7
.2
3
.0
2
.6
8
0
.7
6
.9
E
x
ec
u
ti
v
e
2
5
.2
1
3
.2
4
.9
2
9
.0
2
4
.4
2
4
.3
1
2
.6
5
.6
2
8
.3
2
3
.4
In
te
rm
ed
ia
te
p
ro
fe
ss
io
n
s
2
5
.8
2
2
.9
1
7
.2
2
7
.6
2
5
.6
2
4
.8
1
5
.4
1
8
.1
2
5
.7
2
4
.0
O
ffi
ce
w
o
rk
er
9
.8
9
.5
1
3
.7
8
.8
9
.7
1
3
.5
1
2
.0
1
6
.7
1
2
.5
1
3
.4
B
lu
e-
co
ll
a
r
2
8
.6
4
8
.9
6
0
.7
2
2
.6
2
9
.9
3
1
.2
5
3
.4
5
6
.7
2
5
.2
3
2
.0
C
h
a
r
a
c
te
r
is
ti
c
s
o
f
th
e
sp
o
u
se
E
d
u
ca
ti
o
n
N
o
d
ip
lo
m
a
1
1
.9
2
3
.6
2
9
.2
8
.8
1
2
.7
1
0
.8
2
9
.0
2
4
.2
9
.0
1
2
.3
A
t
m
o
st
lo
w
er
se
c.
ed
u
.
1
5
.5
1
8
.6
1
9
.0
1
4
.9
1
5
.7
1
5
.4
1
6
.6
1
9
.1
1
4
.5
1
5
.5
V
o
ca
ti
o
n
a
l
tr
a
in
in
g
2
2
.3
2
1
.3
2
7
.6
2
0
.9
2
2
.2
2
3
.6
2
1
.0
2
6
.9
2
2
.5
2
3
.5
H
ig
h
sc
h
o
o
l
fi
n
a
l
d
ip
lo
m
a
1
6
.6
1
1
.9
1
2
.1
1
7
.3
1
6
.3
1
7
.2
1
1
.4
1
3
.6
1
7
.6
1
6
.7
U
n
iv
er
si
ty
d
ip
lo
m
a
3
3
.7
2
4
.7
1
2
.1
3
8
.1
3
3
.1
3
2
.9
2
2
.0
1
6
.2
3
6
.4
3
2
.0
N
a
ti
o
n
a
li
ty
F
re
n
ch
b
o
rn
in
F
ra
n
ce
8
3
.0
6
7
.0
6
6
.3
8
5
.7
8
2
.0
8
8
.2
7
4
.2
8
0
.3
8
9
.0
8
7
.2
F
o
re
ig
n
n
a
ti
o
n
a
li
ty
8
.1
2
1
.4
2
1
.6
6
.0
8
.9
7
.5
1
7
.8
1
3
.1
7
.0
8
.3
F
re
n
ch
b
o
rn
a
b
ro
a
d
8
.9
1
1
.6
1
2
.1
8
.3
9
.1
4
.3
8
.0
6
.6
4
.0
4
.5
H
o
u
se
h
o
ld
c
o
m
p
o
si
ti
o
n
a
n
d
m
o
b
il
it
y
3
ch
il
d
re
n
o
r
m
o
re
1
6
.9
2
1
.1
2
6
.7
1
4
.9
1
7
.2
1
5
.9
2
2
.2
2
2
.5
1
4
.7
1
6
.4
4
ch
il
d
re
n
o
r
m
o
re
4
.8
9
.1
1
1
.5
3
.6
5
.1
4
.0
9
.4
8
.4
3
.3
4
.4
G
ir
l-
B
o
y
(b
)
2
4
.6
2
5
.5
2
2
.4
2
5
.3
2
4
.7
2
3
.0
2
1
.6
2
1
.5
2
3
.3
2
2
.9
D
id
n
o
t
m
o
v
e
b
et
w
ee
n
9
0
a
n
d
9
9
3
7
.0
3
1
.2
3
2
.4
3
7
.6
3
6
.6
-
-
-
-
-
M
o
v
ed
w
it
h
in
m
u
n
ic
ip
a
li
ty
1
9
.8
2
3
.8
2
8
.0
1
8
.1
2
0
.0
-
-
-
-
-
U
r
b
a
n
u
n
it
c
h
a
r
a
c
te
r
is
ti
c
s
U
n
em
p
lo
y
m
en
t
ra
te
-
-
-
-
-
1
4
.8
1
5
.7
1
5
.2
1
4
.8
1
4
.9
%
p
u
b
li
c
h
o
u
si
n
g
-
-
-
-
-
2
2
.2
2
2
.3
2
3
.9
2
1
.7
2
2
.2
(a
)
C
h
a
ra
ct
er
is
ti
cs
a
re
ex
p
re
ss
ed
a
s
%
,
ex
ce
p
t
fo
r
a
g
e
a
n
d
ch
a
ra
ct
er
is
ti
cs
o
f
u
rb
a
n
u
n
it
w
h
ic
h
a
re
m
ea
n
s.
(b
)
T
h
e
p
er
ce
n
ta
g
e
o
f
fa
m
il
ie
s
h
a
v
in
g
a
g
ir
l
a
n
d
a
b
o
y
a
s
th
e
tw
o
o
ld
es
t
ch
il
d
re
n
is
ca
lc
u
la
te
d
fo
r
h
o
u
se
h
o
ld
s
h
a
v
in
g
a
t
le
a
st
2
ch
il
d
re
n
.
T
ab
le
1:
Su
m
m
ar
y
st
at
is
ti
cs
-
C
ha
ra
ct
er
is
ti
cs
on
pe
rc
en
ta
ge
s
of
to
ta
l
sa
m
pl
e
29
Lyon sample National sample
(Population Census) (Housing Survey)
Girl - Boy -0.036** -0.047**
(0.017) (0.022)
Boy - Girl -0.031* -0.038*
(0.017) (0.022)
Control variables Y Y
Pseudo-R2 0.0726 0.0632
Number of observations 4,849 2,897
Notes: ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
Figures in brackets give standard errors. All models also include: a constant, age,
squared-age, nationality, diploma, occupational status, spouse’s diploma and nation-
ality.
Table 2: Marginal effects of first two children gender on the probability of having
a third child
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Lyon sample National sample
(Population Census) (Housing Survey)
All ≥ 2 child. All ≥ 2 child.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Public housing 0.0351*** 0.0338*** 0.0557*** 0.0696***
(0.0069) (0.0091) (0.0084) (0.0126)
Personal characteristics
Age (x 10 yrs) -0.0805*** -0.0782** -0.1594*** -0.1619***
(0.0189) (0.0344) (0.0198) (0.0312)
Squared-age (x 10 yrs) 0.0093*** 0.0086** 0.0196*** 0.0193***
(0.0022) (0.0040) (0.0022) (0.0035)
Nationality
French born in France Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Foreign nationality 0.0530*** 0.0687*** 0.0425*** 0.0389**
(0.0129) (0.0185) (0.0167) (0.0193)
French born abroad 0.0191** 0.0383*** 0.0360*** 0.0277
(0.0089) (0.0130) (0.0163) (0.0203)
Education
No diploma 0.0183* 0.0174 0.0288** 0.0124
(0.0108) (0.0149) (0.0133) (0.0157)
At most lower sec. edu. 0.0191* 0.0143 0.0258* 0.0190
(0.0108) (0.0152) (0.0155) (0.0178)
Vocational training 0.0027 0.0016 0.0072 0.0046
(0.0082) (0.0118) (0.0112) (0.0133)
High school final diploma Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
University diploma -0.0014 0.0157 0.0039 -0.0063
(0.0084) (0.0134) (0.0096) (0.0168)
Occupational status Ref. Ref.
Farmer or independent worker -0.0274*** -0.0180* -0.0368*** -0.0076
(0.0064) (0.0093) (0.0077) (0.0154)
Executive -0.0181*** -0.0153* -0.0088 0.0249**
(0.0064) (0.0091) (0.0077) (0.0134)
Intermediate professions Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Office worker -0.0094 -0.0043 -0.0051 0.0166
(0.0076) (0.0114) (0.0108) (0.0174)
Blue-collar 0.0069 0.0062 0.0167* 0.0271**
(0.0069) (0.0099) (0.0094) (0.0139)
Characteristics of the spouse
Education
No diploma 0.0173* 0.0121 0.0523*** 0.0955***
(0.0103) (0.0130) (0.0176) (0.0269)
At most lower sec. edu. 0.0150 0.0111 0.0110 0.0133
(0.0095) (0.0131) (0.0188) (0.0225)
Vocational training 0.0064 0.0064 0.0116 0.0255*
(0.0082) (0.0113) (0.0122) (0.0161)
High school final diploma Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
University diploma 0.0132 0.0028 0.0169 0.0294
(0.0080) (0.0109) (0.0154) (0.0195)
Nationality
French born in France Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Foreign nationality 0.0160 0.0183 0.0154 -0.0040
(0.0103) (0.0130) (0.0196) (0.0131)
French born abroad 0.0147* 0.0097 0.0385*** 0.0424**
(0.0089) (0.0110) (0.0146) (0.0216)
Urban unit characteristics
Unemployment rate 0.3810*** 0.3009***
(0.0075) (0.0790)
Log-likelihood -2,339 -976 -1,571 -642
Pseudo-R2 0.063 0.102 0.099 0.157
Number of observations 10,473 4,849 6,299 2,897
Notes: ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. Each
equation also includes a constant. Figures in brackets give standard errors. For models
estimated on the national sample (columns (3) and (4)), these are corrected for within urban
unit dependencies.
Table 4: Marginal effects from simple probit models of unemployment
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Exclusions %publ. hous. (1) % pub.hous. & ≥4 child. (2)
Dependent variable Unemp. Publ. Unemp. Publ.
hous. hous.
Public housing -0.0306 -0.0133
(0.0521) (0.0487)
Personal characteristics
Age (x 10 yrs) -0.1798*** -0.1115*** -0.1997*** -0.3191***
(0.0300) (0.0382) (0.0514) (0.0766)
Squared-age (x 10 yrs) 0.0212*** 0.0047 0.0231*** 0.0303***
(0.0029) (0.0046) (0.0055) (0.0091)
Nationality
French born in France Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Foreign nationality 0.0540*** 0.0729** 0.0533** 0.1156***
(0.0192) (0.0295) (0.0248) (0.0405)
French born abroad 0.0478** 0.0926*** 0.0360 0.0760*
(0.0210) (0.0344) (0.0238) (0.0441)
Education
No diploma 0.0430** 0.0981*** 0.0270 0.1390***
(0.0203) (0.0325) (0.0240) (0.0437)
At most lower sec. edu. 0.0337* 0.0580** 0.0302 0.0999**
(0.0183) (0.0266) (0.0229) (0.0442)
Vocational training 0.0100 0.0224 0.0091 0.0489
(0.0118) (0.0212) (0.0156) (0.0304)
High school final diploma Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
University diploma 0.0056 0.0057 -0.0022 0.0561*
(0.0103) (0.0172) (0.0184) (0.0289)
Occupational status Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Farmer or independent worker -0.0441*** -0.0962*** -0.0150 -0.0898***
(0.0118) (0.0149) (0.0161) (0.0226)
Executive -0.0156 -0.0986*** 0.0190 -0.0968***
(0.0111) (0.0179) (0.0133) (0.0276)
Intermediate professions Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Office worker 0.0014 0.0629*** 0.0275 0.0934***
(0.0129) (0.0161) (0.0208) (0.0296)
Blue-collar 0.0312* 0.1115*** 0.0428** 0.1308***
(0.0161) (0.0141) (0.0191) (0.0214)
Characteristics of the spouse
Education
No diploma 0.0742** 0.1463*** 0.1264*** 0.1725***
(0.0297) (0.0229) (0.0439) (0.0336)
At most lower sec. edu. 0.0221 0.1084*** 0.0291 0.1496***
(0.0245) (0.0227) (0.0327) (0.0389)
Vocational training 0.0181 0.0604*** 0.0340* 0.0674**
(0.0148) (0.0164) (0.0195) (0.0275)
High school final diploma Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
University diploma 0.0134 -0.0336** 0.0259 -0.0652***
(0.0089) (0.0154) (0.0196) (0.0231)
Nationality
French born in France Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Foreign nationality 0.0116 -0.0241 -0.0107 -0.0707**
(0.0216) (0.0323) (0.0140) (0.0296)
French born abroad 0.0492** 0.0760*** 0.0518** 0.0658*
(0.0193) (0.0247) (0.0256) (0.0341)
Urban unit characteristics
Unemployment rate 0.3772*** -0.2175 0.2710*** -0.5082*
(0.0830) (0.2126) (0.0917) (0.2980)
Instruments
% public housing in the urban unit 0.8500*** 0.7377***
(0.0920) (0.1468)
Girl+Boy -0.0199
(0.0159)
Test on instruments from GMM estimation of linear probability models
H0: instruments coeff. are jointly zero
First stage F-test [p-value] 93.78 [0.000] 13.56 [0.000]
H0: instruments orthogonal to error term
Overid. test Hansen J [p-value] - 0.224 [0.636]
Correlation of residuals 0.383(0.269) 0.391(0.263)
LR test (ρ12 = 0) 1.637 1.769
Log-likelihood -4,301 -1,935
Pseudo-R2 0.148 0.179
Number of observations 6,299 2,897
Notes: ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. Each
equation also includes a constant. Figures in brackets give robust standard errors corrected
for within urban unit dependencies.
Table 6: Marginal effects from simultaneous probit models - National sample (Hous-
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